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Diversity and the political function of 
religious education
Geir Skeie
Questions about the relationship between religion and politics are discussed with particular 
focus on the consequences for religious education. Norway is taken as an example of a 
country where increasing cultural diversity challenges traditional politics of religion. In the 
present climate of conflicting views on the role of religion in politics, religious education is 
higher on the political agenda in many European countries, but it is unclear which path the 
governments choose to follow. For religious educators it is important to engage critically in the 
political debate about religion, and to show a basic political loyalty towards the education of the 
individual child and towards improving the lifeworld of children.
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Introduction
On a world scale religion and politics are as mixed as ever and a massive secularisation of 
international and national politics seems to be far away. This is not only the case in 
countries where religion is considered fundamental to the constitution of the 
nation-state. The president of the most powerful state in the world does not hesitate to 
mention religious motivations behind his world politics. It seems to be a paradoxical 
relationship between the political rhetoric of some US leaders and the freedom of 
religion cherished by the constitution of United States. In European politics religion is 
also on the agenda. The recent debate about the constitution of the European Union 
revealed strong disagreements over the role of religion. Should there be a reference to 
Christianity in the constitution or not? In the end it was not mentioned, but before that 
decision among others a well-known Norwegian professor of political science 
commented the debate in this way: 
The new struggle for a Christian identification threatens to turn back the 
civilisation process of Europe. It demands homogenisation where we now have 
pluralism. It is the overtones of universalism, the cosmopolitical perspectives that 
represent the most valuable in the development of Europe—and it is this 
development that fundamentalists now threaten to reverse. (Eriksen, 2004, quotation 
translated by the author)
Indirectly Eriksen activates the metaphor of a crossroad. Europe has to choose 
between two alternatives. One is a secular vision expressed through the 
declaration of human rights, which is democratic. Another alternative is to 
identify Europe as being ‘Christian’, which means homogenisation or at worst 
fundamentalism. In line with the tradition going back to the enlightenment Eriksen 
has for many years argued a ‘politics of deliberation’ inspired by the theories of J. 
Habermas and K. O. Apel (Eriksen, 1995). This means that neither the basic values 
of society nor political discourse as such can be based on religion or other 
metaphysical entities. Only the rules of conversation are justified as foundational, 
securing the right of everyone to take part in the communication, and this 
communicative rationality is secular in the sense that it is relying on the best 
argument as its basic value.
A secular ethos for European societies could mean that schools should also 
promote this ethos, but such a uniform solution is not as straightforward as it may 
seem to some. Many European countries have a combination of public and private 
educational institutions and on the whole we find a complex structure of institutional 
arrangements reflecting national historical struggles and compromises. The size of 
the private school sector differs greatly even within the closely related Scandinavian 
countries. Denmark has about 12% of children in private schools, while Norway has 
only 2%. The vast majority of the private religious schools are Christian, a few are run 
by non-Christian religious organisations, and many have an ideological or pedagogical 
ethos as their base. Since many private schools are religious schools, issues relating to 
private schools are intertwined with other questions that arise from the complex 
landscape of religious education in Europe (Schreiner, 2001). Some countries have 
confessional church-run religious education in public school premises, and in school 
hours, with or without alternatives for non-church members. Others have religious 
education for all run by the public school, and others have no religious education 
at all in public schools. On the one hand these very differentiated arrange-ments seen to 
be perfectly adapted to local situations, on the other hand there seems to be debate 
about the politics of religious education everywhere, including France where there is 
no religious education (Jackson, 2004). The secular perspective of communicative 
rationality has an important role to play in the debate, but it seems to be limited by an 
implicit connection with the idea of secularisation as a necessary follower of 
modernisation. This idea is now abandoned by social theory (Beckford, 2003). To get 
a broader perspective this article looks into the history of religion and politics, taking 
Norway as an example, and on this basis addresses the cross-national challenges 
related to the changing cultural and religious composition of European local 
communities. Even if the challenges are common, they should be understood on the 
basis of national and local contexts, and this justifies using Norway as a case.
Norway is both an exception and a more common case in a European context, being 
economically well off, not a member of the EU, with a young nation’s strong national 
ideology. Norway has a strong public sector historically based on social democratic 
welfare policies and egalitarian values. For some decades now increasing diversity 
has challenged the dominant understanding of Norwegian society and culture, and 
caused political changes. Within the realm of religious education this resulted in 
1997 in the reconstruction of the compulsory school subject from a confessional 
‘Christianity’ to a broad multi-religious curriculum, but with a main emphasis on 
Christianity. This new subject is common for all students and has no general right of 
exemption.
A closer look at the Norwegian case shows that religious education is a politically 
sensitive project closely related to the politics of religion. As religion is becoming 
more focused in politics globally we should therefore expect religious education to 
become part of this. In the following I will discuss some aspects of the relationship 
between religion and politics, drawing on some examples, mainly from Norway, in 
order to reflect upon the political role of religious education particularly in Europe.
The role of Christianity in the political construction of Norwegian religious 
education
The main focus of Eriksen in the above-mentioned column was the debate about the 
European constitution, but his view has implications for other areas, including the 
politics of education. He argues that the privileged position of Lutheran Christianity in 
the constitution, with the Lutheran church being a state church, in principle has 
common features with fundamentalism, even if—in a secularised country like 
Norway—this does not have the practical implications associated with fundamentalism 
in some other countries. Eriksen points particularly towards the way religious 
education is treated in the Norwegian school system. Here he sees the privileges of 
Lutheran Christianity as an example of intolerance implicitly supported by the 
constitution, and with its roots in the absolutist state. The question is whether this is 
simplifying a more complex issue?
The position of Lutheran Christianity within Norwegian state schools has 
consequences on several levels, the first being general aims of education. Article 2 in 
the constitution says the following: 
All inhabitants of the Realm shall have the right to free exercise of their religion. The 
Evangelical-Lutheran religion shall remain the official religion of the State. The 
inhabitants professing it are bound to bring up their children in the same. (http://
www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-18140517-000-eng.doc)
In its original shape (1814) this paragraph meant that the state was bound to follow the 
Lutheran Confession in all its actions and that all the inhabitants had to belong to the 
Lutheran faith. Much later (1964!) the sentence about freedom of religion was added. 
The authority of the church and the state was brought close together, and even if the 
original power and control system has changed, the paragraph still forms the legal
basis of the state church system. A formal system dating back to the absolutist state 
has needed reinterpretation several times over the years, and often such reinterpretations 
caused great debates.
This example shows that because of the particular constitutional arrangement of a 
state church, issues of religion and politics in Norway are often directly related to the 
role of the state. This tendency is reinforced in a new way by the strong position of 
the welfare state, providing public service solutions in many areas of daily life. Still, 
there is some continuity between the present state system, built by social democratic 
governments, back to the state system run by conservative civil servants in the 
nineteenth century, and this continuity is possible to trace in the politics of religion. 
In both cases there are traces of a pessimistic view of modern culture and the 
sociocultural developments relating to modernity. It is also possible to find a common 
will to use the power of the state and the recourses of religion to counter what is 
seen as cultural disintegration. The strategy of the elite around the 1880s was to see 
Christianity as a unifying social and ideological force, referring to doctrinal and 
confessional Lutheranism. Today’s worries about disintegration caused by 
postmodernity and the challenges of a multicultural society are in the background of 
the religious education reform of 1997. The present remedy is partly a recognition of 
diversity, but mixed with a ‘cultural’ and ecumenical version of Christianity, used as a 
kind of ‘civil religion’, putting emphasis on national heritage and moral values 
(Skeie, 2003).1 Here there are similarities to the debate about the role of Christianity in 
the European Constitution.
The legal background of the present formulations in the curriculum is found in the 
Education Act. Neither school nor religious education is formally connected to the 
Church of Norway, but the Christian religion is still present in the general aims of 
Norwegian schools as these are stated in Section 1–2: 
The object of primary and lower secondary education shall be, in agreement and 
cooperation with the home, to help to give to pupils a Christian and moral upbringing, to 
develop their mental and physical abilities, and to give them good general knowledge 
so that they may become useful and independent human beings at home and in 
society. (Education Act, Section 1–2)
From a point of principle, the mentioning of Christianity can be seen as a modified 
version of the constitutional statement. Religious education is singled out as an 
extraordinary school subject by being treated in detail in the Education Act. Aims, 
content and even teaching methods in religious education are regulated by the Act. 
Section 2–4 is given here as an example: 
(…) Christian Knowledge and Religious and Ethical Education is an ordinary 
school subject that shall normally be attended by all pupils. Teaching in the subject 
shall not involve preaching. Teachers of Christian Knowledge and Religious and 
Ethical Education shall take as their point of departure the objects clause of the 
primary and second-ary school laid down in section 1–2, and present 
Christianity, other religions and philosophies of life on the basis of their distinctive 
characteristics. Teaching of the different topics shall be founded on the same 
educational principles. (Education Act Section 2–4)
In spite of the legal arrangement, the position of Christianity in the present national 
religious education syllabus is not so much treated as an issue of principle, based on 
the state church or general aims of school, but rather more in line with the reasoning in 
the general core curriculum with focus on public support for a Christian cultural 
heritage. The aim in religious education for learning about Lutheran Christianity is ‘to 
provide thorough knowledge’, while goals for the learning about other Christian 
denominations as well as religions or world views only mention ‘knowledge 
about’ (Education Act, Section 2–4). As a practical consequence of this, it is stated in 
the religious education syllabus that Christianity should be allocated about 55% 
of the teaching time of the subject, reflecting the strength of Christianity in 
Norway. The remaining time is split between 25% for non-Christian religions and 
world views, and about 20% for ethics and philosophy (Læringssenteret, 
2002).2 (Lutheran) Christianity is therefore privileged in terms of aims and 
content. To some extent the teaching will also benefit from this, having more time 
for different teaching methods. It is also stated that local schools should adjust 
religious educa-tion teaching to a certain extent in order to reflect the representation of 
religious and world views in the local community. This may lead to an increased 
emphasis on Christianity in most local schools, but also the opposite in some parts of 
the larger towns.
On the one hand Christianity in the Lutheran form therefore has a particularly 
strong position in law, while on the other hand the Lutheran church has no direct 
influence on religious education in Norwegian schools today. The reasons voiced in 
school policy are using ‘cultural’ and ‘democratic’ arguments, stating that the support for 
Lutheran Christianity in the population justifies the privileged position in the 
curriculum. This may be the reason for some Muslim countries showing interest in the 
Norwegian KRL-subject; the possibility to open up religious education, but to keep 
some connection between the nation and the dominant (state) religion. As with all other 
religious organisations, the Church of Norway is responsible for the religious nurture of 
its own members. In order to secure this, the Parliament has recently 
commissioned a tax-based funding for nurture within the Lutheran state church as 
well as other religious organisations and organisations for people with non-religious 
world views. This element of corporation between state and religious communities is 
now being implemented.
The religious education reform of 1997 was justified by a combination of legal 
and pragmatic political reasoning and managed to include many political parties in 
the compromise solution where Christianity had a role in strengthening traditional 
values, functioning as national ideology, and as a cultural resource for national 
identity against relativism and postmodern indifferentism. Apparently, broad 
compromises turns out to be important in religious education politics. Still some are 
left out; in school policy particularly the secular humanists have challenged the 
political role of religion for a long time, and in recent years religious minorities do 
the same. This reflects a more general problem; how does a Christian ‘civil religion’ 
work in a society that gradually discovers itself to be a multicultural and multi-
religious nation?
Cultural and religious diversity and the political construction of Norwegian 
religious education
In the present national curriculum in Norway (1997; revised 2002 and 2005) religious 
education includes Christianity and world religions, secular world views, philosophy 
and ethics. One important reason for giving it this content was the idea that a multi-
religious society needs to give its members knowledge of different religions and world 
views, and that all children should learn about religions together, not be separated 
according to beliefs. In this respect the last curriculum has changed the aims, content 
and teaching in Norwegian religious education significantly. The curriculum states 
that religious education teaching should be impartial and neutral and treat all religions 
and world views equally and that all children should be supported in identifying with 
their own tradition. It is no longer possible to be exempted from religious education as 
such, only from particular parts that include participation in some activity that may be 
considered difficult for reasons of belief. This has been challenged on legal grounds 
drawing on international conventions about general human rights, freedom of religion 
and parental rights. The Norwegian Humanist Association has taken this issue to the 
European Human Rights Court in Strasbourg, where it is presently being considered. 
After extensive evaluations and much debate, religious education still continues in its 
original shape (including the exemption rules), even if minor changes were made in 
2002. In late 2004 a recent decision by the UN Committee on Human Rights has 
challenged this, urging Norway to either introduce the right of full exemption, or to 
change the aims and content of the subject.3
While worries about indifferentism and moral relativism were much debated some 
years ago, the present political debate about religious education in Norway is almost 
totally focused on the relationship between different religions and world views. The 
political construction of Norwegian religious education is therefore running on two 
tracks, combining two strategies: 
(1) Religious education is countering relativism, indifferentism, disintegration and
other aspects of a late modern society, what I have elsewhere called the problems of 
‘modern plurality’. Here the main tool seems to be a privileged ‘cultural’ role for 
(Lutheran) Christianity, and improved teaching methods to vitalise the 
presentation of the Christian tradition.
(2) Religious education is countering conflicts among religious and ethnic groups,
discriminations, racism or what may be called the problems of ‘traditional 
plurality’. Here the tool seems to be a multi-religious curriculum and teaching 
methods with a focus on sharing, comparing and dialogue.
The combination of the two strategies justifies the compulsory subject with only 
limited right of exemption. A recent theoretical study of religious education 
concludes that it is valid and justified to interpret the subject as one and coherent, and that 
the relationship between majority and minority is taken properly care of 
(Gravem, 2004). It is, however, not difficult to see that these two strategies may come 
into conflict with each other. What satisfies the majority may be problematic for
minorities and vice versa, even if ‘majority’ and ‘minorities’ are not at all unproblem-
atic labels. As long as this is not solved politically, the conflict issues are left for the 
schools and the teachers to deal with. They need a working interpretation of the 
religious education, including aims, content and teaching methods that work in practice, 
and that is in conjunction with their professional ethos. This interpretation process 
is a daily process in the individual school and classroom, and more research is needed 
to understand this better (Haakedal, 2004).
On the political level the combined strategy seem to have formed a compromise 
between those who are most worried about moral decay among ‘our own 
youth’ (strategy 1) and those who are most worried about the integration of ‘the 
minorities’ (strategy 2). It was probably also the intention to reach a compromise 
between the interest groups, in this case the Christian churches (comforted by strategy 
1) and the minority religions and secular humanists (comforted by strategy 2). This 
has not worked so well; the churches (in particular the Lutheran) seem more satisfied 
with the situation than the minorities. Still, there are signs that the sharp confrontations 
of earlier years have came to a halt, and that the increased representation of interest 
groups in policy-making has been important in this respect, together with a non-
confronting implementation of the subject on the local school level. Some more infor-
mal reports indicate that the minority children are often more positive about the 
subject than their parents are. If this observation is correct, it may indicate that we are 
witnessing a well-documented tendency in modern Norwegian political history where 
sharp conflicts between classes, interest groups or cultures are gradually mellowed by 
what may be called ‘corporative’ solutions both on national and local level.4 This 
corporatism is not ideologically based, but a series of ad hoc solutions to political 
challenges (Nordby, 1994). Norway is one of the countries in the world with the highest 
percentage of the population participating in volunteer organisations/social movements, 
and has been ranked as one of the most corporatist among several western 
industrialised countries (Wilson, 1990). According to Brochmann and Rogstad 
(2004), minority organisations may also become part of this corporative relationship 
with the state. As interest groups they are actors and may participate in the policy-
making on a consultancy basis, and in return for this influence open confrontation is 
avoided.
Religion and the politics of difference
European history is full of examples of differing relationships between religious 
organisations and the state and how religiously based organisations have tried to 
influence the state politics. One example of religion and the politics of difference can be 
seen in the story of the early Christian Socialists in Norway (Skeie, 1980). Their 
ambition was to bridge the gap between church and the emerging working-class 
movement, but the Christian Socialists ended up being marginalised by both. In the 
early twentieth century, the Workers Party (Labour) became revolutionary, anti-
religious, and strongly against religious education in schools. But in the longer run, 
after the Christian Socialists had been almost forgotten, the Workers Party formed a
government, became reformist, and also developed good relations with the Lutheran 
Church. Today it is often among social democrats that we find the strongest defenders 
of a continuing state church system. They support liberal positions in church 
politics and want liberal theological views to be represented in the clergy. They see 
this as an effort to serve the interests of the majority of church members, and in their 
opinion this is best done through a state–church partnership. This may be called a 
‘corporative’ model since the state church to a large extent plays the role of an interest 
group, however a particularly privileged one.
Seen from a 150-year perspective, social and cultural tensions in Norway have 
mellowed towards the political and economical structure of a modern welfare society 
with a relatively egalitarian distribution of wealth. The possibility for a conservative 
church leadership to have direct influence on political power in the 1880s was 
effectively stopped,5 and the emerging Norwegian workers’ movement therefore did 
not face a strong conservative church leadership with some public support as their 
most challenging ideological opponent. Instead they were confronted by a strong 
lay church movement, partly recruited from the same social strata as Labour, and 
having critical attitudes especially towards those in the church clergy who supported 
liberal theology. Between these two popular movements there was a struggle over 
cultural hegemony in large parts of the twentieth century. Perhaps this struggle had 
some influence on the Norwegian social democrats, having been the most radical 
workers’ movement in Scandinavia, but entering into reformist policies in the 
1930s. Also pulling towards reformism was the experience of German occupation, 
when the vast majority of the Lutheran Church joined the resistance together with 
the workers’ organisations and others. The reconstruction after the war was largely 
considered a common national effort and the struggle over cultural hegemony 
gave way to increased focus on living standards and building a welfare state, before 
new kinds of ‘difference’ appeared on the scene. First came ‘youth culture’ in the 
1960s, and later came ‘minority cultures’ with immigration in the 1970s. 
Multicultural Norway became publicly visible in the 1970s, politically recognised in 
the 1980s and discussed in its full consequences in the 1990s. Parallel to this, but with 
modern organisations dating back to 1917, rights of the indigenous Sami people of 
Norway were recognised, and gradually other national minorities with long history as 
well.
The general welfare state approach to difference, to redistribute goods to all in 
small but equal portions, cannot work when differences are ‘cultural’. The mecha-
nisms for ‘distribution’ of culture, for sharing and not sharing, do not function like 
the (re-)distribution of wealth and benefits.6 Therefore the cultural aspects of society 
cannot be fully managed by the state even if there are many basic questions of rights 
and power that have to find political solutions. Cultural differences are boundaries 
that can be contested, negotiated and changed, and we can hope for them to be 
respected, recognised and discussed. In Norway the political system has often 
contributed to these processes by use of corporative solutions. The establishment of 
social movements and interest groups with legitimate leading representatives and the 
competition between these groups has made it possible for the state to have 
consultations and hearings and, by this, to slowly approach a compromise (Rokkan, 
1966),
and this can also be observed on the local level (Hernes & Selvig, 1981). This is a 
possible, but also challenging, path to follow through the politics of majority/minority 
relationship. Particularly in the last decades the politics of multicultural integration 
seem to swing between a communitarian group orientation that is close to the corpo-
rative tradition, and a liberal individualism with emphasis on rights and duties of each 
citizen, as preferred by the present government (Brochmann, Borchgrevink & 
Rogstad, 2002; Gressgård, 2005). The political dimensions of difference also interact in 
complex ways with social and cultural ones, which can be seen by comparing the way 
gender and ethnicity are dealt with in a Norwegian context (Longva, 2003).
The debate about the hijab (veil), as well as the practice of using it, is an illustrative 
example of how issues of gender, religion and education interact with politics and 
universal principles such as freedom of religion in separate national contexts (Shirazi, 
2001). In Norway, as in other western countries, hijab is also part of a discourse 
about modernity (Kristensen, 2003). According to newspapers, the increasing practice 
of using hijab has occasionally caused problems for individual Muslims in 
Norway, but in later years this has developed into a public debate, much influenced by 
debates in the rest of Europe, and several positions has been voiced in public 
(Høstmælingen, 2004). Those who support the prohibition argue along somewhat 
different lines: 
● The young Muslim girls are oppressed and forced to wear a veil by male authorities in 
the religious communities. In school they should be helped in their liberation 
process by prohibiting the veil at least in school.
● The wearing of the veil is not really a religious issue, but a cultural one, and
should be prohibited because Islamists are using the veil issue today as a political
statement.
● Modern religion is beyond the use of regulations about purity and non-purity and
focuses on issues of spiritual nature. There is no reason to accept anything else in 
public, even if it is free in the private sphere.
When the most recent debate broke out in 2004, the present liberal/conservative 
political government quickly stated that a prohibition of the veil in Norwegian schools 
was not on the agenda (NTB, 2004). One important explanation for this position is that 
there are elements in the political construction of Norwegian religious education that 
quite strongly point in the direction of allowing the veil. The ‘two-track-model’ 
displayed in the regulations of religious education, as well as the syllabus itself, under-
lines that every individual child should be supported in the development of their own 
identity based on their religious background. This is strengthened by the fact that 
parental rights are so important in Norwegian school policy, and was actually earlier 
used as an argument for a mono-Christian religious education: Since most parents 
have baptised their children, a Christian religious education is in accordance with the 
will of most parents. In conclusion, a prohibition against wearing the veil in school 
could threaten to disturb both strategies.
The position of the Norwegian government is clearly different from the official 
French position:7 
All of France’s children, whatever their history, whatever their origin, 
whatever their beliefs, are the daughters and sons of the republic. They have to 
be recognised as such, in law but above all in reality. By ensuring respect for this 
requirement, by reforming our inte-gration policy, by our ability to bring equal 
opportunities to life, we shall bring national cohesion to life again. We shall 
also do so by bringing to life the principle of secularism, which is a pillar of 
our constitution. It expresses our wish to live together in respect, dialogue 
and tolerance. Secularism guarantees freedom of conscience. It protects the 
freedom to believe or not to believe... It is the neutrality of the public sphere 
which enables the harmonious existence side by side of different religions. It 
cannot be tolerated that under the cover of religious freedom, the laws and 
principles of the republic are challenged. Secu-larism is one of the great 
achievements of the republic. It is a crucial element of social peace and of national 
cohesion. We cannot allow it to be weakened. We have to work to consolidate it. 
In all conscience, it is my view that the wearing of clothes or of symbols which 
conspicuously demonstrate religious affiliations must be banned in state schools. 
(Chirac, 2003)
Towards post-national politics of religious education?
However distant the official French position is from the official Norwegian or English 
position, it is clear that the political importance of social cohesion is vital to all three 
countries. There are even tendencies in Norwegian integration policies under the 
present administration that may be seen to point in the direction of a liberal 
‘republican’ ideology not too far from the French, however without the same sanctions 
on religious symbols (Gressgård, 2005). The question is how the different strategies of 
integration will develop and influence each other in a more united Europe. As we 
have seen, the politics of difference are often linked with the politics of religion, and 
politics of religion in Europe are closely related to the varied arrangements of religious 
education. These are largely based on a history of Christian churches being partners or 
opponents of the state. In large parts of Europe today, non-Christian religions and 
ideologies also play an important role, and politically it is particularly important to 
address the issues arising from the significant Muslim minorities.
The case of the veil may serve as an example of regulations that spring from the 
politics of difference. These are regulations mainly made to deal with the Muslim 
population, but once established they will have consequences for other religions, 
including Christianity. Regulations on symbols may very well touch upon traditional 
customs or practices that have developed over generations, and what used to be seen as 
the ordinary way of life becomes a matter of ‘culture’, which today means ‘politics’. In 
this way politics of religion converges with politics of culture, politics of identity and 
politics of citizenship and this complexity needs to be included in the way 
European politics approaches different aspects of growing diversity (Cooper, 2004).
In Norway the political reconstruction of religious education in the 1990s was 
mainly based on the ambition to deal with difference by solving certain societal 
problems conceived as integration of marginalised groups. These problems were 
partly seen as postmodern disintegration and partly as multicultural disintegration. 
The educational challenges associated with problems of postmodernity historically 
date back to the ‘generation gap’ of the 1950s, and can be seen as an extension of 
the problems of modernity (Skeie, 2002). The educational challenges associated with the 
multicultural society have a much longer history, even if they are often conceived as 
‘new’. Earlier the perspective was openly based on an ideology of assimilation 
particularly directed towards the Sami population, but still difference is mainly seen 
as a majority/minority relationship of how to help disadvantaged, discriminated, 
alienated ethnic or ‘cultural’ groups, while the majority is often not pictured as being 
‘cultural’. Different governments have tried to apply ‘group solutions’ in religious 
education, but this has mainly worked to the satisfaction of the majority group. 
Minority groups therefore protest, partly by using arguments based on individual 
(human) rights like the cases brought to the UN Committee for Human Rights. The 
effect of this may paradoxically lead to a less group-oriented approach from the 
authorities, with more emphasis on individuals and parental rights, while the ‘corporate 
channel’ is less used, particularly on the local level. There has so far been no parallel 
in Norway to the English system of Standing Advisory Councils on Religious 
Education.
It is puzzling that the religious education policy of late modern society has often 
been quite focused on the individual as member of a (cultural) group. In syllabuses, as 
in the Norwegian, the development and learning of the individual child is included as 
one of the main aims, but this is not so often reflected in the political discourse on 
religious education. At the same time, western culture is often labelled as individual-
istic. Modern educational theory from Rousseau to Dewey has given much attention to 
the education of the individual child. For many teachers, pupils appear as individuals, 
and the group perspective is often more applied to the dynamics of the class than to 
understand the sociocultural context of children. It seems important, therefore, to 
balance the attention towards the individual and towards the group, particularly in 
religious education.
Religious educators in many countries have worked to get political attention
 towards the multi-religious composition of schools and the implications this has for
 education in general, and religious education in particular. Many researchers and
 practitioners in religious education have contributions to make, based on many
 years of involvement in the multicultural school, but are not always comfortable
 with playing a political role. The recognition of religious groups is increasing in
 educational policy, but it does not necessarily mean that this is done in a context-
sensitive, generous and democratic way. Here, educational policy may benefit more
 from the insights of specialist knowledge, including those researching religious
 education, but then researchers must be independent and not used for specific political 
purposes.8
In addition to the importance of investigating the religious communities, it seems
 appropriate for religious education researchers to keep focusing on the individual
 child, interpreting its life world and its potential, but by reflecting contextually. This
 
is 
also a political position, partly drawing on the perspectives of human rights and
 more particular children’s rights, partly drawing on the democratic ideals of 
educational theory. A child-oriented perspective need not be an attempt to escape 
from
 
plurality whether intra-religious or inter-religious; on the contrary, individuals 
should
 
be seen as different from each other as well as being complex human beings.
The political role of religious education is inevitable and must be dealt with on 
many levels. As researchers, I suggest that presently our political responsibility 
should be towards the individual child and the context the child lives in, and our 
aim should be to interpret this towards the political level of the nation state as 
well as transnational bodies. We should work for curricula as well as teaching that 
gives the individual person access to knowledge that can support both different 
kinds of believing and of not-believing, and gives opportunities to exchange 
thoughts on views and values with others, without fear of being threatened or 
ridiculed, but also with the possibility of developing in new directions. Based on 
this knowledge, children may also be better equipped to engage in the 
political struggles over power and justice, and to come forward with their visions of 
a good society.
Notes
1. For more general background knowledge about Norwegian religious education, see Haakedal
(2001).
2. The RE syllabus established in 1997 was revised in 2002 and again together with the other
school subjects in 2005. These revisions have not changed the main issues discussed here.
Some general information about Norwegian religious education is available in English (http:/
www.ls.no).
3. As a result of the instructions from the UN Committee on Human Rights the Norwegian
government revised parts of the school law, the syllabus and the rules for exemption, putting
this into practice in the autumn 2005. The main content of these changes was to treat the differ-
ent religions and worldviews more equally within religious education, and to make the system
for exemption more flexible and easy to practice. There is still no right of full exemption. The
changes mentioned were not fundamental, but since they were done during the writing of this
article they cannot be discussed further here.
4. ‘Corporatism’ is not used in its original meaning referring to authoritarian state corporatism as
in Mussolini’s Italy, but to indicate an integrated cooperative relationship between indepen-
dent organisations and state. Rokkan (1966) has described the particular role of organisations
in the Norwegian political system as ‘corporative pluralism’, a concept still discussed in
political science.
5. One illustration is the debate about the religious foundation of politics in the 1880s during the
struggles for a parliamentary system of government and independence from Swedish rule. A
special call to ‘the friends of Christianity in our country’ was issued by the conservative elite
just before the elections of 1884 (Wisløff, 1961; Oftestad, 1998). Seen from a longer perspec-
tive, some of the underlying ideas of the infamous call of the 1880s can be detected even in
current policies.
6. Barth (1994) discusses in Chapter 8 the understanding of culture in complex societies and
particularly emphasises the different degrees of ‘sharing’.
7. This comparison of Norway and France ignores important historical differences; the
French secularism with roots back to the Enlightenment is also a result of the church–
state relationship established in 1905 after many years of struggle (Beckford, 2003,
pp. 91–94).
8. An example of an initiative from researchers that also has a bearing on political decisions is the
ENRECA policy statement; see http://enreca.isert-network.com/docs/index.htm. The work of
the Oslo Coalition is also relevant here (http://www.oslocoalition.org/).
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